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POLICYFORUM
 A 
1930s film shows a dog running 
and jumping inside a fenced enclo-
sure ( 1)—except that the dog has 
a strange-shaped head, odd stripes, and a 
rigid tail that can only move side-to-side. 
The “dog” is actually one of the last thyla-
cines, a marsupial predator also called the 
Tasmanian tiger. The fi lm was taken shortly 
before humans extinguished the species for-
ever. Or did we? Recently, new technolo-
gies have made it plausible to try to revive 
many recently extinct species. Scientists 
around the world are discussing, and work-
ing toward, “de-extinction” ( 2). 
Currently, three approaches to de-extinc-
tion seem most likely to succeed: back-
breeding, cloning, and genetic engineer-
ing. If the extinct species left closely related 
descendants, it might be possible to use 
selective breeding to produce progeny with 
the phenotypes of the extinct species, as the 
auroch project in Europe has been doing 
since 2008 ( 3). With newly cheap genome 
sequencing methods, one might guide back-
breeding with genome sequences from sam-
ples of the extinct species. Of course, back-
breeding will only be possible in situations 
where the genetic variations of the extinct 
species survive in the descendant species.
Cloning provides another possibility. 
Using cryopreserved tissue from the last 
known Pyrenean ibex, a Spanish group 
used somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) 
to revive that extinct subspecies. Out of 
several hundred efforts, however, only one 
fetus survived to term, and it died minutes 
after birth from lung abnormalities ( 4). 
This example highlights two problems with 
SCNT: it is neither very safe nor effi cient 
and will only work if viable cell nuclei are 
available. This will likely be the case in only 
a few very recent extinctions.
Genetic engineering offers a third 
approach. Take an extinct species—say, 
the passenger pigeon—that left suffi cient 
samples to allow high-quality whole-
genome sequencing. DNA in cells from a 
similar living species—perhaps the band-
tailed pigeon—could be edited to match 
the extinct species’ genomic sequence. The 
modifi ed cells could then be used to produce 
living birds that, genomically, were mainly 
band-tailed pigeon but partially passenger 
pigeon ( 5). By using targeted replacement 
of genomic sequence ( 6) across several loci, 
much of the extinct genome could be recon-
structed within several generations.
Neither the back-breeding nor genetic 
engineering approaches would yield an ani-
mal that had exactly the same genome as 
any member of the extinct species for many 
years, if ever. The cloning approach, in the 
few cases where viable nuclei are avail-
able, would produce a genomic twin to one 
member of the extinct species—but only 
one. Does one individual (or a set of clones) 
make a “species”? Even if genomic iden-
tity is necessary, is it suffi cient? The revived 
individuals would not have the same epigen-
etic makeup, microbiome, environment, or 
even “culture” as their extinct predecessors.
Risks and Objections
Objections to bringing back extinct animals 
fall into five categories: animal welfare, 
health, environment, political, and moral.
Animals created in the de-extinction 
process could end up suffering, either as 
a result of the processes used or because 
of their particular genomic variations. We 
know, for example, that SCNT can lead to 
high levels of deformity and early death 
( 7). The Animal Welfare Act and its institu-
tional animal care and use committees limit 
precisely this kind of suffering ( 8). Beyond 
physical suffering, some animal advocates 
might oppose de-extinction as they oppose 
zoos—on the grounds that they exploit ani-
mals for unimportant human purposes, like 
entertainment.
Newly de-extinct creatures might prove 
excellent vectors for pathogens. An extinct 
animal’s genome could also conceivably 
harbor unrecognized, harmful endogenous 
retroviruses.
If the species either is released or escapes 
into the general environment, it might do 
substantial damage. Even extinct species 
that were not pests in their past environ-
ments could be today. For example, less than 
200 years ago, billions of passenger pigeons 
migrated each year between the eastern 
United States and Canada. Today, those 
regions have far more humans, far larger 
urban centers, very different agriculture, 
and largely transformed ecosystems. The 
American chestnut, a main food source for 
the passenger pigeon, is now nearly extinct 
in the wild. Even in the same location, the 
passenger pigeon would today be an alien, 
and potentially invasive, species—perhaps 
another starling or even an avian kudzu.
The political risks are considerable, 
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too. Current protection of endangered and 
threatened species owes much to the argu-
ment of irreversibility. If extinctions—par-
ticularly extinctions where tissue samples 
are readily available—are not forever, pres-
ervation of today’s species may not seem as 
important. Also, genetics and, more broadly, 
modern bioscience, could face a backlash 
if citizens perceive public investments in 
bioscience as being used to revive species 
rather than cure human disease.
Finally, some people will complain that, 
whatever its consequences, de-extinction is 
just wrong—it is “playing god,” “reversing 
natural selection,” or an act of hubris. Oth-
ers may argue that we cannot know enough 
about the consequences to re-introduce a 
species. But neither do we know the full 
consequences of its extinction or its con-
tinuing nonexistence.
Benefi ts
Like the risks or objections to de-extinc-
tion, we see the benefi ts falling into fi ve cat-
egories: scientifi c knowledge, technological 
advancement, concrete environmental ben-
efi ts, justice, and “wonder.” These benefi ts 
are quite similar to the arguments made for 
preserving currently endangered or threat-
ened species.
De-extinction could allow scientists the 
unique opportunity to study living members 
of previously extinct species (or, at least, 
close approximations to those species), pro-
viding insights into their functioning and 
evolution. Some revived species may be 
translated into useful products; for exam-
ple, it is conceivable that new drugs may be 
derived from extinct plants.
De-extinction could lead to techno-
logical advances. The most likely would 
be improvements in genetic engineering, 
such as the targeted replacement of large 
stretches of genomic DNA ( 6).
Some researchers argue that “re-wild-
ing” with existing species, locally extinct in 
particular habitats, can help restore extinct 
or threatened ecosystems ( 9). The same can 
be argued about the restoration of extinct 
species. The revival of the wooly mammoth 
as a major grazing animal in the Arctic, for 
example, might provide substantial ben-
efi ts by helping restore an arctic steppe in 
the place of the less ecologically rich tun-
dra ( 10).
Justice is a viscerally attractive argu-
ment for de-extinction, at least for species 
that humans drove to extinction: We killed 
them. We have the power to revive them. We 
have a duty to do so. But to whom or what 
do we owe that duty? Would it apply to all 
species in whose extinction humans played 
the sole, the leading, or a substantial role?
The last benefi t might be called “wonder,” 
or, more colloquially “coolness.” This may be 
the biggest attraction, and possibly the big-
gest benefi t, of de-extinction. It would surely 
be very cool to see a living wooly mammoth. 
And while this is rarely viewed as a substan-
tial benefit, much of what we do as indi-
viduals—even many aspects of science—
we do because it’s “cool.”
Legal Issues
We may also need to consider several legal 
issues. First, would a de-extinct species be 
“endangered”? The answer is unclear. In the 
United States, the Endangered Species Act 
provides for listing as “endangered” any 
species “over utilized” for scientifi c pur-
poses, inadequately protected by current 
regulations, or whose existence is threat-
ened by other “manmade factors” ( 11)—all 
considerations that would seem to apply to 
a newly revived species. Ironically, inter-
national organizations typically tie endan-
gered status to whether species’ population 
has declined—the opposite of the concern 
about newly revived species ( 12). Uncer-
tainty about the status of de-extinct species 
will affect numerous civil, criminal, and 
international laws.
Second, could a revived species be pat-
ented? This answer also seems unclear. 
The United States and many other coun-
tries allow patents on living organisms ( 13). 
Although “products of nature” cannot be 
patented, is a revived species a “product 
of nature” in light of the inevitable differ-
ences from its predecessors? Additionally, 
the “lost arts doctrine” may allow the pat-
enting of previously existing species if they 
have been completely lost to the public ( 14).
Last, would de-extinction be regulated 
and if so, how? Again, the answer is unclear. 
And even if there were no legal regulation, 
the concerns previously discussed could 
dampen the enthusiasm for de-extinction by 
some research entities, such as universities. 
This could drive the efforts toward less con-
trolled, or constrained, enterprises.
What Should Be Done?
The answer to the question—What to do 
about de-extinction?—depends in part on 
closely defining the question. Consider 
three different “bottom-line” questions.
First, should de-extinction be publicly 
funded? This answer seems, to us, “largely 
no.” The potential tangible benefits from 
de-extinction are too small and the poten-
tial objections are too serious to justify sub-
stantial government expenditure. One might 
argue that governments fund science proj-
ects with similarly small practical relevance, 
but those “cool” projects, like the Mars rov-
ers, present fewer risks and objections.
Second, should de-extinction be cate-
gorically banned? Here the answer seems a 
fairly clear “no.” The risks look fairly small 
and probably manageable. If people want to 
devote their own time, money, and efforts to 
the endeavor, the risks to the world do not 
seem to justify complete prohibition.
Third, should de-extinction be regu-
lated? Here, we think the answer is “Yes—
somewhat.” The animal welfare and envi-
ronmental concerns are real. They could be 
mitigated by protective action but only if 
the law requires it. Bringing all de-extinc-
tion efforts under something like the Ani-
mal Welfare Act and requiring careful envi-
ronmental assessments before any planned 
releases (as well as approved precautions 
against inadvertent release) do seem appro-
priate. Whether other kinds of regulation 
are needed is less clear, although there may 
be some cases, like any attempted revival of 
extinct hominid species, where special con-
trols, or bans, would be appropriate.
De-extinction is a particularly intrigu-
ing application of our increasing control 
over life. We think it will happen. The most 
interesting and important question is how 
humanity will deal with it.
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